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The conflict between Christianity and Islam is a core issue for all varieties of European neo-nationalist and nativist1 right-wing 
ideo logical organisation, from populist and far-
right parties to extra-parliamentary groups 
and individuals. As a mundane political-social 
critique, this defensive and nationalistic form 
of anti-Islamism focuses on the downsides of 
mass immigration from Northern Africa and 
the Middle East, stressing the incompatibility of 
gross gender inequality, sexual intolerance and 
religiously motivated Islamist terrorism as well 
as the theocratic sharia system of laws with the 
secular European model of society (Vuorinen 
2014: 188–94). Antisemitism makes an appear-
ance in the guise of the old Nazi concept which 
portrays ‘World Jewry’ as a community of inter-
national financial exploiters, allegedly inspired 
in their misdeeds by their religion. However, this 
notion is being countered by a stronger, pro-
semitic ideology, portraying the state of Israel 
as an ally in the struggle against Islam(ism). 
As ‘traditional’ European religions, Christianity 
and the different historical and local varieties of 
paganism serve as important points of positive 
identification.2
1 Referring to an ideology that restricts the 
right to citizenship of a particular country 
to individuals who either have been born 
there, genetically belong to the native stock, 
or have long established roots in the coun-
try. 
2 Militant neo-Protestant, neo-Lutheran, or 
neo-Calvinist affiliations in Europe I have 
not yet come by, but would not dismiss 
offhand the possibility of their emergence. 
Over the blackened earth 
the old troops parade. 
W. B. Yeats (1865–1939)
 
Introduction: nationalisms and religions, 
past and present
From the sixteenth century onwards, the 
developing modern European states defined 
their politics in terms of, among other 
issues, religious preference and (in)toler - 
ance. The emergence of Protestantism in 
North ern Europe was followed by the 
estab lishment of exclusively Protestant 
states – notably the then Swedish empire, 
whose early wars on Catholicism wreaked 
havoc mainly in the German lands. The 
hostilities between a declining Sweden and 
a growing Russian empire lasted longer, up 
until the early nineteenth century. Fought 
across the fault line between Orthodox and 
mainly Lutheran (in the case of Poland, 
Trad itional Catholicism, for obvious rea-
sons, appeals to the neo-nationalists of for 
example Poland and France, while Angli-
canism is part and parcel of the Ulster 
Unionist ideology. The former represent 
particular aspects of neo-nationalism, while 
the latter is a continuum of a longstanding 
nationalist ideology; their religious think-
ing, however, falls outside the category of 
neo-religionism proper. 
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also Catholic) cultural spheres, they grad-
ually led to annexations of several non-
Ortho dox areas into the Russian state; the 
annexed areas were allowed to maintain 
their original faith within the multi-ethnic 
imperial context. The religious divergence, 
however, would soon intertwine with lin-
guistic differences, capitalised upon – along 
with other cultural-political differences – 
by the emerging domestic nationalist elites, 
seeking independence, and in most cases 
gaining it, in the aftermath of WWI. 
Imperialism and religion were thus 
intertwined with modern European state 
nationalism right from the start. The inter-
war period brought its own distasteful fla-
vour to the soup with the rise and even-
tual fall of several ultranationalist, fascist, 
more or less racist regimes. Particularly the 
memory of the Holocaust, the Nazi project 
of exterminating European Jewry – along 
with other elements of society it deemed ‘to 
be sub-human’– has tainted the reputation 
of nationalisms and intra-religious disputes 
since the end of WWII. With the establish-
ment of the binary Cold War system, the 
religious divide for a while went dormant, 
but has gained renewed momentum after 
the collapse of the Cold War in the 1990s. 
Another prominent system of imperi-
alist oppression that reached its peak in 
the nineteenth century was colonialism. A 
perceived religious – Christian – superior-
ity, aided by a perceived racial superiority, 
provided the means for a ‘moral’ justifica-
tion of several European overseas empires. 
The dismantling of the colonialist system, 
in the post-WWII years, accompanied by 
an atonement for the racist thinking it con-
tained, has repercussions on the relations 
between peoples/nations and religions to 
this day.
* * *
Ever since the turn of the millennium, the 
three ‘religions of the book’, Christianity, 
Islam and Judaism, have gained renewed 
visibility in an increasingly multicultur-
alist Europe, particularly in connection 
with a growing right-wing radicalism. 
Social scientists have come to agree about 
the important political role of religions 
across the spectrum of neo-nationalist 
ideologies – from garden-variety cultural 
conservative movements to right-wing 
parlia mentary parties and beyond, to the 
extra-parliamentary far right inhabited by 
nativist to neo-fascist organisations and 
violent lone-wolf ideologues. 
For obvious reasons, Islam – either 
as the ‘alien’ religion of immigrants from 
Northern Africa and the Middle East to 
Europe, or in the guise of radical Islamism, 
or as a perceived ‘foreign’ influence threat-
ening the presumed cultural unity of the 
receiving countries – is recognised as 
the main exemplar of the religion-based 
enemy for all European neo-nationalists. 
Accordingly, it receives the lion’s share 
of publicity on religious hostilities, being 
mentioned by practically every author on 
the subject.3 Particularly under the concept 
of Islamophobia, anti-Islamist attitudes are 
dismissed as misinformed, alarmist, and/
or psychologically immature.4 The openly 
leftist critique readily equates anti-Islam 
not only with Islamophobia, but with fas-
cism and racism.5 
3 See, for example, Akkerman et al. 2016a: 
5, 2016b: 34–5; Banks and Gingrich 2006: 
4–5, 10–11; Gullestad 2006: 76–9; Hervik 
2006: 102–3; Larsson 2014; Minkenberg et 
al. 2014: 9, 12, 17; Mudde 2007: 6–7; Sunier 
and van Ginkel 2006: 110–21.
4 Gardell 2010; Hannerz 2006: 281; Jokisalo 
2016: 189–221; Jupskås 2016: 186; Mudde 
2007: 69–75, 82–6; Sander 2014.
5 Leplat 2015: iii–iv; Kellner 2015: 19, 24; 
Löwy 2015: 29; Alm 2015: 99, 101–4; Com-
mission antifasciste du NPA 2015: 113, 133, 
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The take on Judaism is more multifac-
eted; it gets mentioned much more rarely 
than Islam, and is discussed more briefly 
when mentioned. On the one hand, neo-
nationalists are routinely suspected of 
anti semitism, either blatant or focussed 
on Nazi-style conspiracy theories. On 
the other hand, the pro-Israel attitudes of 
many neo-nationalists, based on the idea 
of a common fight against Islam in both 
Middle-Eastern and diaspora contexts, are 
also recognised by most authors, as well as 
their appreciation of the Jewish state as a 
paragon of a modern nativist state.6 It has 
also been suggested that the neo-national-
ists who position themselves as defenders 
of the Jews, particularly against the ‘new’ 
Islamist antisemitism, are merely striking a 
pose, so as to evade being associated with 
old-school Nazism (Akkerman 2016: 145; 
Heinisch and Hauser 2016: 76). 
The points of positive religious identi-
fication of neo-nationalists get even fewer, 
and more vague, mentions. Catholic con­
servatives are often observed to be work-
ing hand-in-glove with neo-nationalists in 
countries where Catholicism traditionally 
dominates the religious scene, such as Italy 
(Stacul 2006: 167, 170), France (Gaillard-
Startzmann 2006: 184, 191; Commission 
antifasciste du NPA 2015: 155–8), Belgium 
and Austria (Mudde 2007: 85; Seiser 2006: 
209). Interestingly, Protestant Lutheranism 
appears to serve as the ‘national’ religion in 
Norway much in the same way as traditional 
Catholicism in the Central European coun-
tries (Gullestad 2006: 76–9). Meanwhile, 
143–4; de Jong 2015: 269–75, 279–80, 289, 
301; Svensson 2015: 319–20.
6 See, for example, Akkerman et al. 2016a: 8, 
2016b: 34–5; Minkenberg et al. 2014: 10, 
17–18; Mudde 2007: 6, 22, 79–84; Wiederer 
2014: 37; Commission antifasciste du NPA 
2015: 132; de Jong 2015: 478; Svensson 
2015: 324.
the pagan aspect of the different varieties of 
neo-nationalism has been either ignored, 
dismissed as marginal, or even demonised 
(e.g. Gardell 2003; Minkenberg et al. 2014: 
16; Wiederer 2014: 35–6).
What is missing in this rationalistic 
analysis is the recognition of the essentially 
romantic nature of the neo-nationalist and 
nativist movements,7 reflecting heavily also 
on their take on religions. On the reverse 
side of an exclusivist hate ideology there is 
an ardent wish to love and to belong – to a 
cherished ethnic-cultural group, to a chain 
of generations, to an ancestral place – and 
to be recognised as a valued member of a 
local cultural community (Goodhart 2017).
 
Aim, focus, sources, approach 
My aim as such is not to refute the findings 
of the authors referenced above. Rather, I 
wish to provide a more multifaceted and 
detailed picture, adding some shades of grey 
to the prevailing black. Quite understand-
ably, neo-nationalist ideologues embrace 
‘native’ European religious traditions, from 
high church Catholic Christianity to local 
pagan cults and related folklore. Equally 
self-evidently, Islam(ism), particularly in 
relation to recent mass immigration from 
North-Africa and the Middle East, appears 
as their main religious (or pseudo-reli-
gious) antagonist, with a long history of 
mutual ideological and geopolitical enmity, 
lately enhanced by the alleged struggle for 
demographic prominence. As we will see, 
the apparent grand disagreement about 
Judaism and the state of Israel – either a 
powerful ally against Islamism or a par-
ticipant in a joint global conspiracy against 
the Western Christian nations – eventually 
7 This is not to say that they do not have also 
their own rationale based on anti-multicul-
turalist and nativist principles.
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boils down to a trifle, at least when it comes 
to the ideologies of the extreme right. 
Mapping the historical influences and 
parallels, political justifications and ideo-
logical consequences of each variety of reli-
gious politics among the far right, I hope to 
add also to the more general understand-
ing of the ideological undercurrents of the 
early twenty-first century neo-nationalist 
scene, presenting them as the newest addi-
tion to a longer joint history of nationalism 
and religions. 
To achieve what might be called a level-
headed analysis of one of the most debated 
ideological phenomena of our time, I 
approach their programmatic texts as 
normal ideological constructs – by nature 
one-sided, selective, passionate, militant, 
and persuasive.
* * *
The practical aim of this article is to pro-
vide an up-to-date survey on the role of dif-
ferent religions in the ideological think ing 
of recent radical extra-parliamentary right-
wing groups and individuals, who in the 
2010s have gained prominent media visibil-
ity, due either to violent acts of terrorism or 
action directe operations. In want of a more 
precise geographic term, I define my area of 
interest as Northern Europe with a Western 
twist – including the Nordics, Great Britain, 
Germany, Austria and France, but exclud-
ing, at least at this stage (on the basis of 
apparent differences of political tradition), 
the other Mediterranean states, Russia and 
the former ‘Eastern Europe’. 
To manage an academically sound view 
that genuinely adds to our understanding 
about what is going on in the neo-nation-
alistic scene, I will not focus on the volatile 
and transient, often grossly exaggerated, 
day-to-day expressions online. Instead, 
I analyse publicly available, permanent 
programmatic texts, online and in print, 
presented as foundational by their authors 
and therefore likely to convey the most 
stable, serious and thought-through ide-
ological aspects of each movement and 
individual writer. In the case of organised 
movements, the jointly processed and col-
lectively approved nature of such texts adds 
to their ideological weight. 
Both individual writers and collec-
tives active on the neo-nationalist scene 
rely on online visibility for recruiting fol-
lowers and distributing ideological propa-
ganda. Contrary to individual, self-radical-
ised authors, who typically speak to private 
followers, collective movements openly 
recruit for new membership, with descrip-
tions of past activities and plans for future 
ones. As a caveat, one must keep in mind 
that some of these texts may have been 
designed deliberately as a front, allow-
ing their supporters to pose as relatively 
harmless in order to veil a more sinister 
intent. On the other hand, their contents 
are aggressive enough as they are, so they 
may well present the ideologies ‘as is’, with 
potential for further radicalisation as well 
as for calming down. 
* * *
My primary focus is on ideologies that 
have already inspired grave and/or recur-
ring aggressive action by relatively young 
authors/perpetrators who publish in 
English to reach an international audience. 
To trace such contents, I analyse 
1) the online manifesto 2083: A European 
Declaration of Independence, published 
by Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik 
(b. 1979) immediately before embarking 
on his killing spree in 22 July 2011, with 
a death toll of 77; 
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2) the pamphlets and online materials 
published by the Génération Identitaire 
/ Identitäre Bewegung / Generation Iden­
tity youth movement, originating in 
France and active also in Austria and 
Ger many since early 2010s, engaging in 
direct action campaigns against Muslim 
immigration and landmarks of Islam; 
and 
3) the online programme, Our Path, by 
the Nordic Resistance Movement aka 
NordFront, with its home base in the 
Nordic countries, operating online in 
local languages but also in English, 
whose riot-prone public appearances are 
designed to maximise negative visibility 
in the media. 
As such individuals, movements and 
incidents, so far, thankfully, are rare, as 
well as for the sake of broader scope and 
context, I include a secondary layer of 
ideologic al texts, by authors belonging to 
older age groups that have contributed to 
the development of the ideology. My choice 
of source materials may thus be termed 
cumulative; however, I try my best not to 
be eclectic. The ‘founding fathers’ include 
the French veteran philosopher Alain de 
Benoist (b. 1943), his late countryman 
Dominique Venner (1935–2013) and the 
British ethno-nationalist Arthur Kemp (b. 
1962). 
Utilising a recent comparison oppor-
tunity, I analyse the manifesto The Great 
Replacement, by a Westerner anti-Islamist 
of European descent, namely the Australian 
Brenton Tarrant (b. 1991), who in Christ-
church, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019 
attacked worshippers in two local mosques, 
killing 50. The author professed a depend-
ence on Breivik’s ideology, as well as a 
strong identification with his own ‘white’ 
European ethnic origin (Tarrant 2019). The 
religious contents of the 2011 manifesto, 
by the original wannabe Knight Templar, 
Breivik, are discussed in relation to his 
recent copycat/acolyte.
* * *
To understand an ongoing neo-nationalist 
ideological process, I utilise the approach 
known as methodological empathy, devel-
oped by the two central authorities on 
the study of historical fascisms, George L. 
Mosse and Roger Griffin, and conceptu-
alised by the latter (Griffin 2008: xiv, xxiv, 
21, 99, 2012: 18, 144, 206–11 and 2018: 27, 
34–40, 47, 50). Simply put, the approach 
consists of taking an ideological message 
seriously and at face value, for the sake of 
study, regardless of how aggressive or dis-
tasteful its contents may be, analysing it in 
its political, economic, geographical and 
temporal context to find out why it is sup-
ported, by whom, and to what end. 
In relation to the 2010s Northern Euro-
pean extra-parliamentary radical right, a 
list of focal questions that need to be ten-
tatively asked, even though many of them 
cannot yet be definitely or completely 
answered, include the following. 
Who are the leaders of the extreme right, 
and what is the essential societal change or 
new conflict they react to? How do they see 
the present situation? What are their hopes 
and fears?8 What do they want to remove, 
stop, change, strengthen, or bring about? 
What kind of meaning do they invest in 
the cultural, religious, communal, social, 
legal and administrative traditions, history, 
8 I find Angela Merkel’s much-quoted phrase 
‘Must not give in to fear’ very problematic. 
As a strong primal emotion, fear cannot 
be managed at will, nor dismissed only 
by being told to do so (see Bourke 2005). 
As witnessed by the recent climate scare, 
fear, like hope, is a powerful incentive for 
politic al action.
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geography and the natural features of their 
local and national environment? In whose 
interest and on whose mandate do they see 
themselves as acting, and by what means? 
Is the division into moderate parliamen-
tary and extreme extra-parliamentary fac-
tions going to die down with the establish-
ment of regular parliamentary groups with 
moderated versions of the shared ideology? 
Or, will the extreme factions develop into 
outlets for romantic desperados, with even 
more extremist, and potentially violent, 
antisocial aspirations? 
World religions according to neo-nationalism
Anti-Islamism
For Northern European and Nordic neo-
nationalists, opposing Islam is mainly based 
on mundane matters, with the focus on cul-
tural, political, societal and legal issues. 
Muslims are targeted for problems related 
to mass immigration, from terrorist inci-
dents to burdening social security systems 
at the expense of the native European poor. 
The main points of interest are the hypo-
thetical cultural and demographic threats, 
related to the birth-rates of Muslim fam-
ilies, of a gradual Islamisation of European 
culture and a replacement of her ethnic 
stock. The animosity towards Islam as a 
religion appears as a corollary of what the 
neo-nationalists see as an attempted colon-
isation of Europe. Nevertheless, the authors 
take the trouble of acquainting themselves 
with those aspects of Islamic dogma that 
may regulate the contacts between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, pointing out passages of 
the Koran that can be interpreted as jus-
tifications for exploiting and deceiving 
Christians as infidels.
A critique of Islam occupies the best 
part of the first two books of the over-1500-
page-long manifesto9 by Anders Behring 
9 I have used the permanent online version 
Breivik, titled 2083: A European Declaration 
of Independence and released on the inter-
net only hours before he set out on his kill-
ing spree. Breivik (2011: chs. 1.1–1.30) 
describes Islam as being incompatible with 
the fundamental Western social and politi-
cal values, including secular democracy, a 
secular judicial system, the rule of law, free-
dom of speech, the work ethic, religious 
and sexual tolerance, and gender equality. 
As the exact opposite of Western ideals, 
he associates Islam with theocratic polit-
ical rule, cruel punishments, and Sharia 
courts. Compulsory veils and other cover-
ing garments for women as well as the prec-
edence given to men in the Islamic family 
law are presented as tokens of gross gender 
inequality. Contrary to the explanation of 
it as a moderate spiritual struggle, Breivik 
construes jihad or Holy War literally, as the 
incitement to continuous violent hostil-
ity towards non-Muslims. Yet, as an indi-
cation of the basically non-religious, polit-
ical nature of his antagonism, he stresses 
that all Muslims, and indeed anyone who 
accepts the Western societal values and 
wish to partake in the European-style com-
munal life are welcome to do so.10 
As character evidence of the assumed 
Islamist conspiracy, Breivik lists historic al 
practices used to manifest the inferior 
status of Christians and Jews in the Muslim-
dominated societies of the past – from 
available at <publicintelligence.net>. As 
there are in circulation also other editions, 
with identical content but slight variation in 
the layout, I refer mainly to chapters instead 
of page numbers.
10 Among his sources of inspiration Breivik 
lists Bat Ye’or (2006), Robert Spencer (2005) 
and the Norwegian online anti-multicul-
turalist pen-named Fjordman, as well as 
other online and printed sources, includ-
ing statistics, case descriptions and opinion 
pieces. On Breivik’s manifesto in general, 
see Vuorinen 2014 and 2016. 
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slave markets, selling infidel women taken 
as spoils of war, to the jizya tax collected 
from Christians and Jews, their restricted 
right to worship, and a particular dress 
code – claiming that Muslim immigration 
into Europe is a new form of religious taxa-
tion, justified by the supposed superiority 
of Islam. In addition, he mentions the alleg-
edly Koran-inspired al­Taqqiya, or right 
to deceive non-Muslims without punish-
ment in order to save one’s life, as a further 
justification for financially exploiting the 
non-Muslims. Furthermore, the supposed 
right/duty to kill particularly Jews, but also 
Christians, when sighted, is presented as a 
justification for both the Islamist terror in 
Europe and the oppression of Christian and 
other religious minorities in the Middle 
East (Breivik 2011: chs. 1.1–1.30).
Brenton Tarrant, the New Zealand 
shooter, saluted ‘Commander Breivik’ in 
his manifesto The Great Replacement11 
not only as a source of inspiration, but as 
a trailblazer and fellow combatant. Tarrant 
fully shares Breivik’s ideal of fighting Islam-
ism and Muslim immigration, to protect 
the Christian faith, Western nations and 
European ethnic stock from what he sees 
as an ongoing white genocide by Muslims 
(Tarrant 2019: 2–3 and passim). Like 
Breivik, Tarrant also included links to vari-
ous internet pages with contents that sup-
port his views. 
In his manifesto, Tarrant (2019: 11–13, 
20–1) presents himself as a modern Cru-
sader, re-enacting the original religious-
military conflict between Christianity and 
newly-established Islam in the distant 
past. In a more current tone, he justifies 
11 Published online immediately before the 
attack, like Breivik’s. ‘Replacement’ refers 
to the perceived threat of ethnic Euro-
peans being replaced by immigrating non-
Europeans, with big families and mainly of 
Islamic faith. 
his attack on the particular mosques with 
political and security reasons, referring to 
their alleged prior online history of jihad-
style extremism. Along ethno-nationalist 
lines, he pronounces that Muslims should 
remain in their own homelands, not invade 
‘our lands’ where their high fertility rates 
cause distress to the native populations. He 
also refers to converts from Christianity to 
Islam as ‘traitors’.
The Nordic Resistance Movement is 
an anti-immigrationist, Pan-Nordic nativ-
ist group, which proudly displays its rather 
showy Nazi sympathies on its webpages. 
Its online programmatic publication, Our 
Path: New Politics for a New Time (2016: 
9–14, 18–19 and passim) directly men-
tions neither Islam nor Christianity, being 
content to condemn ‘parasitic’ mass immi-
gration from outside the Nordics as ‘new 
colonialism’, while preparing to defend 
the rights of the Nordic races with arms. 
However, when describing a post-collapse 
future society reorganised according to 
trad itional principles – with women active 
as mothers and homemakers, men as pro-
viders and defenders – they draw a distinc-
tion between the Nordic and the apparently 
Islamic way of treating womenfolk: 
Our views on women are not inspired 
by any desert religion but are derived 
directly from the natural and egali-
tarian vision of our Nordic ancestors 
(Our Path 2016: 38; my italics).
 
In a similar vein, the Generation Iden tity 
movement (generation referring roughly to 
those born in the 1980s and 1990s) declare 
their respective homelands, as well as 
Europe in general, to be off-limits for all, 
including Muslim, immigrants. Taking as a 
starting point exclusive nativist and ethno-
nationalist principles, they introduce an 
inverted, positive version of the restricting 
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principle. The globally applicable ethno­
pluralist ideal allows nations and cultures 
to prosper, each in its own way and, most 
importantly, in its own space, in an atmos-
phere of mutual respect, separate but equal, 
thus genuinely preserving cultural diversity 
and ensuring peaceful conditions for all 
(Generation Identity 2013: 7–12; Willinger 
2013: 41–4, 71–7, 82–3; Willinger 2014: 19, 
21, 38–40).
The original French Identitarian ‘fight-
ing community’ proudly counts itself as 
having begun the October 2012 dem-
onstration at the construction site of 
the Grand Mosque in Poitiers – a loca-
tion of great symbolic importance as the 
battle site where Charles Martel defeated 
a Muslim army in 732. Equating religious 
and polit ical Islam, the movement declares 
a modern French Reconquest, modelled 
in the vein of the original Reconquista 
which reclaimed Spain from Muslim rule 
by means of Catholic forces in the eighth 
to fifteenth centuries (Generation Identity 
2013: 7, 12–13, 18–9, 28–9, 37). 
A hundred youths, men and women 
from all over France, have just entered 
the future Grand Mosque and occu-
pied the roof. Across the front façade, 
facing the minaret, we have un -
furled a banner with a clear message. 
‘Immigration, mosque construction, 
REFERENDUM’. By this, its first 
major act, Generation Identity intends 
to place itself in the front line of the 
fight for our identity. 
It will soon be 1,300 years since Charles 
Martel stopped the Arabs at Poitiers 
following a heroic battle which saved 
our country from Muslim invasion. It 
happened on 25 October 732. Today, 
we have reached 2012 and the choice 
is still the same: live free or die.
Mosques are not mere places of wor-
ship but cultural centres, places for 
strengthening the community, embas-
sies of Islam and bases for conquest. 
Your claim that constructing mosques 
will stop praying in the streets is utter 
nonsense. Those street prayers are 
political instruments which serve 
to impose further mosques on us! 
(Generation Identity 2013: 18, 25)
The religiously motivated anti-Islam-
ism, expressed by references to the Cru-
sades, is complemented by a mundane cri-
tique of the current multiculturalist society, 
in desperate nationalistic tones that at 
times verge on racism, at others borrow the 
Nazi Blut­und­Boden vocabulary.
We are the generation of ethnic frac-
ture, of the total failure of integration, 
the generation of forced cross-breed-
ing. … We have stopped believing that 
Abdul is our brother, the planet our 
village, and humanity our family. We 
have discovered that we have roots 
and ancestors – and thus a future. Our 
only inheritance is our blood, our soil 
and our identity. We are the heirs of 
destiny. (Generation Identity 2013: 
9–10)
A nation can recover from an eco-
nomic crisis or a war, but not from 
the replacement of its population. 
Without the French, France will no 
longer exist. (Generation Identity 
2013: 19)
In his two booklets, titled Generation 
Identity: A Declaration of War against the 
‘68ers (2013), and A Europe of Nations 
(2014), Markus Willinger blames the 
1968 generation of importing foreign-
ers, mainly of Muslim origin, in order to 
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create a multi cultural society for what the 
young gener ation sees as frivolous rea-
sons – to add ‘diversity’ and ‘colourful’ 
cultural attractions, in the process happily 
shattering what they despised as ‘boring’ 
European trad itions – all the while expect-
ing the newcomers to immediately mod-
ernise and adapt to their liberal European 
ways. To curb the unfortunate experi-
ment, the Identitarians, acting as the young 
indigenous Europeans – ‘the rightful heirs’ 
– now claim back the continent. However, 
they also claim to be willing to maintain 
peaceful political relations with the Arab 
world, provided that the cultural spheres 
are kept separate in the future (Willinger 
2013: 17, 38, 95–9, 102–3 and 2014: 38–40, 
59–60, 88–90). 
The author openly mocks the multicul-
turalist generation for their apparent con-
descending attempt to enlighten and edu-
cate Muslim immigrants, in order to make 
them into modern Westerners. Instead, 
Muslims opposed your fanatical and 
heedless ideology with an equally 
fanatical religion, the political Islam. 
… Today millions of Muslims live in 
Europe and laugh at your ideology 
with contempt. You still hope to be 
able to win them over. You call this 
integration. Yet it’s time to recognise 
one thing: the proud Muslims of the 
East will never accept your beliefs 
and theories. … For some time now, 
the most radical of the Muslims, also 
known as Salafists, have been on an 
aggressive counteroffensive. They are 
proselytising in the heart of Europe. 
Among the uprooted and disori-
ented Europeans, there are a few who 
apparently find Islam an anchor in the 
storm. … The presence of millions of 
Muslims in Europe represents a con-
tinuing threat to the continent. Not 
because the Muslims are the embodi-
ment of pure evil, but because your 
multicultural society does not work. 
(Willinger 2013: 63–6)
Towards the end of the above argu-
mentation, there is, however, a passage that 
stands out for its expression of basic reli-
gious tolerance. 
We condemn neither Muslims nor 
Islam. Here we are a thousand times 
more tolerant than you ever were. We 
neither hate nor demonise. We don’t 
claim to have found the absolute truth 
but recognise the unique and legitim-
ate truths of each and every culture. 
(Willinger 2013: 66)
Later on, Muslim immigrants are never-
theless dismissed in no uncertain tones, 
patronising them while offering safe pas-
sage home, as well as support in developing 
their communities of origin. Associating 
Muslims with tents may have several impli-
cations, from actual Calais-style tent camps 
of hopeful migrants, or a pejorative associ-
ation with poor housing conditions in gen-
eral, to a more archaic image, referring to 
an imagined nomadic Arab culture or even 
to the tents used by the Muslim armies 
during the Crusade period (see below).
Muslims and Africans! Take down 
your tents and leave this continent. 
Entire regions of the world already 
belong to you. We’ll gladly help you 
make your homelands better places, 
help you to build and shape them. 
Even more so than European help, 
Africa and the global East need you 
and your strength. (Willinger 2013: 
88)
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The racially oriented British ethno-
nationalist Arthur Kemp (2012 and 2013: 
36–41 and passim) lists Muslims among 
the many equally unwelcome extra-Euro-
pean immigrant groups. As his main focus 
is on Europeans as indigenous peoples – as 
carriers of a plethora of valuable local and 
national cultures, threatened by demo-
graphic pressure – he has little interest in 
religions as such. Meanwhile, the French 
philosopher-soldier Dominique Venner 
(2015: 3, 18–25, 56, 63–80, 130–1) claims 
to recognise an essential difference between 
Christianity and Islam: while the one is a 
religion, the other is also a community, a 
law and a civilisation. Like Breivik, Venner 
also points out the traditionally inferior 
position of Muslim women and the violent 
conquests made in the name of Islam. As he 
sees it, the weakness of post-WWII Europe 
has indeed developed into a Spenglerian 
moment, allowing ‘tired old Europe’ to be 
colonised by vigorous Islamic migrants. 
Judaism: antisemitism and pro-Israel attitudes
When it comes to Jews, Judaism and the 
state of Israel, opinions are divided among 
the neo-nationalists. The starkest hostil-
ity is expressed by the Nordic Resistance 
Movement. Their take is not ethnic-racist 
as such, nor is it very religion-oriented 
either, but is based on a ‘World Jewry’ type 
of concept, formulated into a Nazi-style 
economic and cultural critique. 
The short second chapter of Our Path 
(16–17) focusses on the issue of a sup-
posed ‘global Zionist elite’, allegedly acting 
in the interest of the state of Israel and of 
what is termed (positive) Jewish racism. 
Zionists are presented as a parasitic class 
of international capitalists, a hidden power 
that controls not only the global monet-
ary infrastructure, but also all major mili-
tary resources and media houses. As ‘God’s 
chosen people’, Zionists allegedly consider 
themselves as having a divine right to rule 
the world. They are said to work towards 
multiculturalism, mass immigration and 
liberalism with the aim of dividing and 
conquering all other bases of polit ical 
power besides themselves, at the same time 
destabilising and eventually dissolving all 
other national cultures and traditional 
social norms. Echoing older conspiracy 
theories about Jews, the Nordic Resistance 
Movement claims that once in power it will 
prohibit such ‘malicious and secret soci-
eties engaging in subversive operations’. 
However, a person’s ‘Jewishness’, in the 
ideological sense, ultimately depends on 
their choices and actions, not on an ethno-
religious essence:
Even non-Jews include themselves 
in the global Zionist elite, motivated 
by their own religion or egoism. It 
should be noted that not all Jews are 
Zionists and that there are Jews who 
stand against the Zionist endeavour 
for power. (Our Path 2016: 7, 16–7)
The rest of the neo-nationalist authors 
have a more positive take on Judaism. The 
long-standing conflict between Islam and 
Judaism in the Middle East gives incentive 
to Breivik’s (2011: 186, 202, 206–8, 337, 
1373 and passim) appreciation of the state 
of Israel, and the Jewish diaspora, as nat-
ural allies in the fight against Islamism. He 
also expresses admiration towards Judaism 
both as a religion and as a cultural trad-
ition. Tarrant’s (2019: 14, 18) is a straight-
forward ethno-nationalist attitude towards 
Judaism: as long as they live in Israel, it is 
‘ok’ with him. Kemp (2013: 52–63) admires 
the Zionist project as ‘the only prac tical and 
surviving ethnostate in the world’, while 
recognising the crucial role of widespread 
antisemitism in its creation.
The most neutral reaction to the 
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current conflict of Islam and Judaism in the 
Middle East comes from the Identitarians. 
Willinger expresses sympathy for both 
sides of the dispute over the Temple Mount 
in Jerusalem, recognising the special signi-
ficance of the ancient religious site.
In the deserts of the holy land, the 
ancient traditions of two peoples col-
lide, and they both fight for their 
highest values, the holy sites of their 
national, cultural, and religious iden-
tities. … The conflict is neither of an 
economic nor a political nature; it is 
entirely cultural. This struggle isn’t 
about money or resources, but sym-
bols and holy places. (Willinger 2013: 
91–2)
Recounting the long history of cruel-
ties on both sides, Willinger (2014: 88–90) 
doubts there is any possibility of ever 
resolving the conflict. Seeing that outside 
meddling mainly aggravates the situation, 
he declines any unconditional crusade-
style support for Israel. Utilising the situ-
ation to demagogically argue for his own 
ideas, he points out the folly of expecting 
any two religions – in this case, Christianity 
and Islam – to live in peace with each other 
in a shared space, for example, in Europe.
If anything can be learned from the 
conflict in the Middle East, it’s that 
having two entirely different peoples 
in one territory is an atrocity and a 
crime. (Willinger 2014: 89)
Neo-pagans of Roman and Nordic varieties
The main neo-pagan trends within neo-
nationalism relate to ancient Roman and 
Nordic-German cultures – the former 
added with Central-European local colour, 
the latter tinged, at least in the eyes of out-
siders, with Nazi antecedents. 
Venner, in more ways than one, was the 
Roman among the neo-nationalist authors. 
His military-masculine ethos is inspired 
by a mixture of the glorious history of the 
Roman legions, the medieval knighthood 
and the heroes of classical Greek narra-
tives from Homer onwards, with the addi-
tion of the modern bravery of Claus von 
Stauffenberg and others, who attempted 
to murder Adolf Hitler in 1943. His deci-
sion to take his own life was carried out as 
a Roman-style public suicide. Venner shot 
himself in 21 May 2013, in Nôtre Dame 
Paris, apparently in protest against multi-
culturalism, feminism, the legalisation of 
gay marriage, and the inability of the French 
government to curb Muslim immigration, 
thus allegedly bringing down European 
civilisation. The Central-European streak 
of Venner’s paganism manifests itself in 
powerful imagery of sacred forests, nature 
animated with spirits, and ritual sacri-
fice, related to the hunter-warrior identity 
of male brotherhoods. Being no egalitar-
ian when it comes to gender roles, Venner 
nevertheless stressed the importance of the 
mystical sexual union of male and female, 
particularly as described by the classical 
pagan authors (Venner 2015: 17, 26–54, 
81–91; Gottfried 2015). 
Venner’s countryman Alan de Benoist 
(2004) is remarkably sober in compari-
son. For him, Greek and Roman paganism 
as well as traditional Catholicism are the 
core ingredients of European cultural and 
religious heritage, invaluable as a spiritual 
resort in the imminent crisis of individual-
istic modernity. 
Compared to the founding fathers dis-
cussed above, the history-conscious and 
emotional paganism of the Identitarians 
is softer and somewhat less erudite, often 
manifesting itself as a quasi-religious love 
of the natural and cultural landscapes of 
the Fatherland. 
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As a collective, Generation Identity 
(2013: 37) is content to mention the ancient 
pagan cultures of Athens and Rome, as 
well as of the Celts, as important sources 
of current European identity, expressing 
respect for and identifying with the prehis-
toric pagan ancestry as original Europeans. 
In his foreword to Willinger’s first book, 
French Identitarian Philippe Vardon (b. 
1980) evokes images of romantic, pastoral 
nationalism mixed with modern symbols 
of state power, adds the chain of gener-
ations, and wraps the lot up in a powerful, 
if also potentially alarming, rhetoric of Us 
vs. Them – the latter identifiable as multi-
culturalist EU elites, liberal modernists and 
immigrants. 
They have defiled our flags, erased our 
frontiers, twisted the very names of 
things. With them, the homeland is no 
longer the land of one’s fathers! It runs 
into a nebulous idea, an abstraction, 
a construct. For us it represents the 
most concrete things of all: our words 
and songs, our forests and mountains, 
our bell-towers and castles, our rela-
tives’ graves and our babies’ cradles . 
We carry our flag within us and trace 
the frontiers ourselves: this is our iden-
tity! The agents of systems of killing 
peoples – to quote Guillaume Faye’s 
formidable formula – would like to 
break the chain of our heritage: we’re 
here to fix its links. (Vardon 2013: 8)
In his second book Willinger emulates 
Vardon’s romantic despair when contem-
plating the allegedly threatened ancestral 
landscapes, mixing it with paranoid ‘camp 
mentality’.
It is a struggle for Europe itself, for 
Europe’s cities, streets and homes, for 
our meadows, mountains, and lakes. 
It’s a struggle for our homeland, and 
we are losing. (Willinger 2014: 19)
In a more sober tone, Willinger (2014: 
75–7) recognises the importance of Roman 
and Germanic pagan heritage for the cur-
rent European cultural identity – spread 
during the period of migration and mixed 
with the local beliefs, thus forging conti-
nent-wide common traditions. According 
to Willinger, they still persist, even though 
Christianity has always sought to hush up 
the existence of preceding religions. He 
even declares that old-style traditional 
Christianity is no longer a living influ-
ence. Rather, Europeans are what he terms 
‘pagan Christians’, lax in worship and tol-
erant of other gods, not proselytising. To 
regain genuine spirituality and revitalise 
their culture, Europeans should embrace 
both pagan and Christian heritage, especi-
ally by reviving the Greek and Roman, as 
well as Germanic festivals.  
The Nordic variety of neo-pagan-
ism borrows from Scandinavian sources. 
While Breivik (2011: 742, 901, 1400) con-
tents himself with referring to his Viking 
ancestry as inspiration and source of pride, 
Nordic Resistance Movement proudly flies 
a flag adorned with the Scandinavian Tiwaz 
rune, signifying Tyr, Odin’s son, and asso-
ciated with war.12 The movement’s overall 
ideological take capitalises on the heritage 
of the Nordic cultural sphere, such as the 
promotion of indigenous peoples (includ-
ing minorities), languages and pagan folk-
lore, spiritually accentuated environmen-
talism and respecting their Nordic ancestry 
(Our Path 2016: 12–5, 18, 29–31). 
Tarrant (2019: 13, 37, 40–2, 72) gener-
ally recommends that the peoples remain 
true to their native faiths. Ending his 
12 For details, see Wikipedia entries on ‘Tyr’ 
and ‘Tiwaz’.
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manifesto with a ‘Goodbye, god bless and 
I will see you in Valhalla’, he mixes the 
flippant with the solemn, and Christian 
with pagan. However, his environmental-
ism, vener ation of ancestors while look-
ing towards future generations, as well as 
the idea of a ‘Roman’ death of a heroic sol-
dier are well in harmony with the different 
aspects of neo-pagan ideology. 
Christianity and neo-Catholicism
Many supporters of the current 2010s 
European radical right movements embrace 
traditional Christianity. Along with nation-
alism, the Christian religion functions 
as the logical antithesis of both their per-
ceived main adversaries; that is to say, the 
recent mass immigration and the secular/
atheist post-1968 spirit of the liberal Left, 
particularly in its present guise as the pro-
moter of individualist, multi-gender, multi-
culturalist, multi-religion ideals of society. 
In the Northern and Central European 
countries, religiously more mixed in regard 
to Christian denominations, extra-parlia-
mentary right-wing movements tend to 
produce thinkers who, without always 
being anti-modernist or pro-Catholic as 
such, nevertheless share the romantic and 
intensely emotional religious tradition-
alism of their Nordic fellow ideologues 
(Vuorinen 2014: 188–9 and 2016: 145–51). 
In mainly Catholic countries, Catholi-
cism is part and parcel of the received 
Chris tian heritage. For de Benoist (2004; de 
Benoist and Champetier 2012) and Venner 
(2015) as well as the Identitarians, Catholi-
cism appears as a normal, uncompli-
cated European practice, albeit threatened 
by both home-grown secular modern-
ism and immigration from non-Christian 
countries. 
The French Identitarians recognise 
the Christian roots of European culture 
and society; they also express compassion 
towards Middle East Christians, persecuted 
by Muslims. As became apparent from 
their statement, released at the building 
site of the Poitiers mosque in 2012, quoted 
above, they also strongly associate them-
selves with the Christian Crusaders who 
defended European lands against Muslim 
invaders and settlers (Generation Identity 
2013: 37–40). 
Willinger’s take is more complex. Asso-
ci ating the present Church with primitive 
fanaticism, intolerance and general back-
wardness, he refuses both High-Church 
and atheist options, looking instead for 
a church that would genuinely support a 
community of modern Christians.
Religious [Christian] fanaticism in all 
of its forms is incomprehensible to us, 
and often seems primitive and stupid. 
Yet deeply religious people and cul-
tures fascinate us, for we know they 
have something we lack: a deep, inner 
feeling that they are sheltered and pro-
tected. A lucid certainty in matters of 
right and wrong. 
We can only imagine how it might 
feel not to be plagued by constant 
self-doubt. We will never feel that way 
ourselves, for religion has become 
unthinkable. We can’t obey dogmas, 
and so we feel ourselves at once su -
perior and inferior to the fanatics, … 
Yet even nothingness itself makes 
no sense to us. How are atheists sup-
posed to know that there is no God? 
In this sense we believe in an indefi-
nite higher power that may or may not 
exist. (Willinger 2013: 21–2)
In mainly Protestant countries the atti-
tude towards Catholicism varies from dis-
interest and hostility to an ardent wish 
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to return to the original Mother Church. 
For converts, Catholicism often appears 
as undiluted Christianity, with a long his-
tory of earthly and spiritual power, grand 
cere monies and a full palette of sacra-
ments, many of which have been stripped 
from the Protestant versions of Christian 
ritual. Combining the ornamental with 
the mystical, neo-Catholicism often mani-
fests as romantic, intensely emotional and 
personal, sometimes admixed with anti-
modern and anti-liberal traits. Combined 
with neo-masculinity, neo-Catholicism 
produces the romantic ideal of the medie-
val Christian Knight, embodying a selfless 
commitment to defending the Faith and the 
Crown, as well as protecting the defenceless 
and the poor. On a personal and emotional 
level, an imagined knighthood provides 
both an ideal community, a sense of his-
tory and destiny, trans-gener ational con-
tinuity as a member of an ancient institu-
tion, a moral tradition, and an ethic code 
of self-discipline, self-respect, loyalty and 
sacrifice.13 
In the case of both Breivik and Tarrant, 
modern knighthood involves a commit-
ment to one’s race and the Western nations. 
They see their personal quests as part of 
a great battle between Christianity and 
Islam, a re-enactment of the Crusades 
(Breivik 2011: 1:11–14, 1:20–2, 3:11–20, 
3:62–70, 3:72, 3:153 and passim; Tarrant 
2019: 4–5). Both also include the element 
of martyrdom, or voluntary self-sacrifice. 
Breivik (2011: 858, 867, 913, 947, 1328–9) 
manifestly expected to be killed in action, 
while Tarrant (2019: 12–3, 55) expressed 
doubts about his survival, urging his fellow 
Christians and Westerners to follow his 
example, joining the grand crusade to die 
13 See Fukuyama (2018: 18–22) on the history 
and philosophy of the warrior-defender 
identity.
a hero’s death. A third case in point is the 
public suicide, committed by another self-
publicised knight, Venner, who did not take 
others with him when shooting himself in 
the Paris Notre Dame on 21 May 2013. 
Breivik claims membership of a 
modern order of Knights Templar, alleg-
edly recently revived in Great Britain, 
to combat Islam in present-day Europe. 
His manifesto in cludes a detailed trea-
tise on the history, ideo logy, symbols and 
battle gear of the origin al Templars, com-
plete with a sample of his own modern-
day designs based on them. He recounts 
the histories of two great battles in which 
Christian Europeans defeated Muslim 
armies, praising Charles Martel, the hero 
of the battle of Tours (Poitiers), as a great 
strategist and leader of men. The cryp-
tic digit 2083 in the title of his manifesto 
refers to the incoming 400th anniversary 
of the second battle at the gates of Vienna 
in 1683, where the Catholic Christian lead-
ers of the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth jointly 
defeated the Ottoman Turks for the second 
time. His motto, De laude novae militia (‘In 
praise of the new militia’) – is a quotation 
of St Bernhard of Clairvaux, the patron 
saint of the original Templars, celebrating 
the victorious Templars as the liberators of 
the Temple Mount in Jerusalem; the text is 
quoted mainly for the description of ideal 
knighthood it includes (Breivik 2011: 3:11–
20, 3:72). When it comes to his personal 
‘Justiciar Knight Commander’ Templar 
avatar, it is anybody’s guess whether he 
originally meant it as an abstract romantic 
pose, appropriated it as a usable, readymade 
identity, or contemplated it as an archetypal 
personification of a moral philosophy.
Like Breivik, Tarrant expressed sym-
bolic allegiance to the historical defence of 
Europe against Islamic invaders by inscrib-
ing the names of Charles Martel and other 
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Crusaders on the weapons he used (see for 
example The Guardian 15.3.2019). He, too, 
claims to have contacted reborn Templars, 
to ask for their blessing in support of the 
attack. In addition, he salutes Breivik, 
thanking him ‘for receiving his blessing 
for my mission after contacting his brother 
Knights’. As further, historical inspiration 
he mentions Pope Urban, who in 1095 
called Christians to the First Crusade, to 
take the Holy City of Jerusalem back from 
Seljuk Turks, as well as the victory of the 
Battle of Vienna in 1683 (Tarrant 2019: 17, 
25, 29, 41–2). 
Conclusion: a clash of civilisations,  
and what comes after? 
This article deals with aggressive political 
ideologies that preach against multicultur-
alist ideology, favouring instead the nativ-
ist or ethno-nationalistic principle; that is 
to say, for each nation their own country, 
or, for each culture its own geographic al 
space. Their most prominent feature, as 
opposed to other, more moderate neo-
nationalist schools of thought, is that they 
openly oppose the presence of newcomer 
religious-cultural-ethnic minorities, chiefly 
Muslims, on European soil, toying with 
designs of forced eviction or even destruc-
tion of recent immigrant groups. Many 
of them also flirt with notorious histor-
ical precursors with impressive death tolls, 
from the Crusaders to the Nazis. 
Seen from the outside, their expressed 
ways of thinking easily fall into the category 
of hate speech, with intolerant, anti-Islamist 
and racist undertones. Seen from the inside, 
they equally acknowledge many objects of 
collective love, including Christian heri tage 
and pagan folklore, the homeland, local 
and national traditions, and the family, to 
be fought for and protected. Cultural trad-
itions cannot be secured by owning them, 
but must be cherished collectively to keep 
them alive. Apparently, those who love 
traditions have the most to lose in times 
of rapid change, while others embrace the 
change and expect to fare better because of 
it. As neo-nationalists see it, the difference 
between conservative traditionalists and 
progressive modernists is a major schism 
of our time. 
The current extreme-right neo-nation-
alist thinking represents the renewal, re-
enactment and /or revival of several old 
schools of thought. The programme thus 
embodies an impressive array of what 
might be termed neo­tendencies – from 
neo-nationalist and neo-conservative to 
neo-romantic, neo-collective and neo-
masculine. Neo-spiritual and neo-religious 
notions combine well with the general neo-
traditionalist frame. 
Both religious and nationalistic tenden-
cies connect to the idea of an emotional 
community, as they both produce a feeling 
of being a part of something bigger than 
oneself. Instead of the modernist ideal of 
human beings as separate, independent, 
free individuals, neo-nationalists empha-
size belonging and togetherness. National 
and religious communities as well as estab-
lished religious-cultural traditions, collec-
tively shared, not only join people together 
temporarily, but offer a sense of continuity 
beyond the individual life span (Staub 
1989: 15–6, 21–2, 32, 39–42, 53–5, 99, 105; 
Waller 2007: 146–61, 172; Griffin 2012: 18, 
144). 
In an age of singleness and childless-
ness, a perceived/imagined continuity 
from ancestry to future generations may 
provide emotional stability for those who 
have neither siblings, spouse nor offspring. 
The contemporary togetherness with like-
minded coevals and the vertical cross-
generation continuity combine, ground-
ing an individual both into a present-day 
collective and a cross-period continuum. 
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Close togetherness, in turn, creates both 
in-group affili ation and enmity towards 
others. In the current situation, the reli-
gious divide provides a powerful ideolog-
ical engine for both identity-building and 
for drawing bound aries between in-groups 
and out-groups.
Another neo-traditionalist, anti-mod - 
ern ist streak of neo-nationalist thinking is 
its expressed wish to reinstate the positive 
role of men in society: as spouses, fathers, 
providers and defenders. Combined with 
religion, the neo-masculine ideal produces 
the image of the Christian Knight – emi-
nently applicable in a perceived context 
of European nations being once again in 
danger of succumbing to the expansion 
of Islam, enabled by globalist, liberal EU 
elites. Heated nationalist conflicts easily 
give rise to political violence, with opera-
tives motivated by an idea of potential self-
sacrifice for one’s national community – the 
latest case being the New IRA, defending a 
united Ireland against the establishment of 
a so-called hard border between EU Irish 
Republic and post-Brexit Britain. 
The neo-masculine streak, introduced 
by the founding fathers of neo-national-
ism, de Benoist and Venner, is particu-
larly strong among its youngest generation. 
The youth-movement aspect, though far 
removed from the usual Youth Studies cur-
ricula, is nevertheless essential for assessing 
the future and potential significance of the 
phenomenon. Combined with patrimony 
issues, the struggle for a right of inherit-
ance has the makings of an epic conflict 
over the symbolic ownership of Europe. 
Some obvious worst-case scenarios 
related to the current developments have 
already come into being. An historical re-
enactment of an ancient conflict that gave 
rise to the original Crusades seems to be 
in progress. Instances of actual violence 
include the deeds of the two self-styled 
Templar terrorists, plus the lesser mayhem 
caused by the Identitarians and the Nordic 
Resistance Movement, on the one hand, 
and the deeds by the now nearly defeated 
Middle-Eastern Caliphate, founded by pan-
nationalistic, neo-Islamist ISIS, notori ous 
also for terror attacks, on the other. It is 
also worth noting that the exact same mili-
tant ethos, combined with romantic ultra-
masculine warrior hero imagery, were typi-
cal for the broadly media tised propaganda 
by the opposing side of modern anti-Islam-
ism, namely the ISIS, at its peak. 
In a potential best-case scenario, the 
aggressive ideology formation, even as 
practised by the above individuals and 
groupings, may eventually function as a 
political safety valve, keeping most individ-
uals from resorting to actual violence while 
venting an otherwise suppressed grievance. 
The exclusivist and aggressive expressions 
typical of the radical neo-nationalists and 
nativists can be perceived as symptoms of 
a new type of social friction, with a strong 
potential of bringing on a societal conflict 
that ends in violence. However, the situ-
ation may also calm down, for example 
with the emergence and gradual establish-
ment of moderate neo-conservative par-
liamentary parties within the European 
politic al scene, able and willing to negotiate 
an eventual peaceful solution.
Taken at face value, the positive, in-
group related emotional aspects of neo-
nationalist programmatic texts appear to 
be intensely romantic. Theirs is not the 
modern aspect of ‘romance’ as something 
bright, cute and harmless, painted in light 
pink shades, but its opposite appeal – the 
darker shades of passion (in both senses of 
intense love and equally intense suffering) 
and perceived destiny consciousness. To 
dismiss this as something naïve, feeble or 
ridiculous is to ignore the main appeal and 
strength of radical neo-nationalism. 
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